Algunas puntualizaciones sobre las interpretaciones representacionalistas de la teoría del conocimiento de Tomás de Aquino

Abstract

 With the publication of recent studies such as Species Intelligibilis: From percetion to knowledge by Leen Spruit (1994-5) and Theories of cognition in the later Middle Ages by Robert Pasnau (1997), there has been a significant growth in the interest among Medieval Philosophy scholars about subjects linked to the theory of knowledge, manly during the XIII and XIV centuries. In this context, the debate about representationalist theories gained importance. Such theories, as Claude Panaccio states, are those who assign a central function to the mental representations within the knowledge process. Our purpose is to analyze the role of these representations in Thomas Aquinas theory of knowledge. Firstly, we will examine critically the “official” or “traditional” interpretation of Thomas Aquinas’ gnoseology, which, due to its emphasis on a realistic point of view, has overlooked in some way the significance of mental representations. Secondly, we will examine the different nuances the notion of representationalism has in our context. Finally, we will discuss about whether Aquinas’ relationship between intellect and species has a merely cognitive character or whether the dimension of knowledge as an act deserves more attention.